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In an idealized scenario, self-healing systems predict,
prevent or diagnose problems and take the appropriate ac-
tions to mitigate their impact with minimal human interven-
tion. To determine how close we are to reaching this goal
we require analytical techniques and practical approaches
that allow us to quantify the effectiveness of a system’s re-
mediations mechanisms. In this paper we apply analyti-
cal techniques based on Reliability, Availability and Ser-
viceability (RAS) models to evaluate individual remediation
mechanisms of select system components and their com-
bined effects on the system. We demonstrate the applicabil-
ity of RAS-models to the evaluation of self-healing systems
by using them to analyze various styles of remediations (re-
active, preventative etc.), quantify the impact of imperfect
remediations, identify sub-optimal (less effective) remedia-
tions and quantify the combined effects of all the activated
remediations on the system as a whole.
1 Introduction
Self-healing systems are expected to respond to prob-
lems that arise in their environments with minimal human
intervention. To achieve this, these systems may employ
a variety of remediation strategies including preventative,
proactive and reactive strategies. In the ideal case, such sys-
tems will use a combination of these strategies to predict,
prevent or diagnose and react to problems. To determine
how close we are to realizing this goal we require rigorous
analytical tools that quantify the efficacy of the remediation
mechanisms, and by extension, allow for quantitative eval-
uations of entire self-healing systems.
The most well-understood evaluation tools for general
computing systems however, are performance-centric. Per-
formance benchmarks, such as those produced by the Na-
tional Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) [19], the
Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC R©)
[23] and the Transaction Processing Performance Council
(TPCTM) [26], are routinely used to demonstrate that an ex-
perimental system prototype is better than the state-of-the-
art because it delivers acceptable or superior performance.
They are also used as reasonable workloads to exercise a
system during experiments.
Whereas performance benchmarks can also be a source
of reasonable workloads for self-healing systems, perfor-
mance numbers, however, do not allow us to draw conclu-
sions about one system being “better” than another with re-
spect to its ability to heal itself. Measures concerned with
overall system performance do not adequately capture the
details that distinguish one remediation mechanism from
another e.g. remediation accuracy/success rates, the im-
pact of remediation failures, the consequences of remedia-
tion style, remediation timings, the impact of remediations
on system manageability and accounting for partially auto-
mated remediations. This deficiency of performance bench-
marks limits our ability to use them as the primary means
of comparing or ranking self-healing systems.
We posit that analytical tools that can be adapted to study
the many facets of remediations, including but not limited
to those mentioned, will provide greater insights into the
design, development and evaluation of self-healing systems
than pure performance-evaluations.
In addition to analyzing the details of remediation mech-
anisms, there are a number of high-level measures that also
can be used to differentiate self-healing systems. According
to [11], a self-healing system “...automatically detects, di-
agnoses and repairs localized software and hardware prob-
lems” [11]. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that these
systems exhibit fewer severe-outages, better reliability and
availability characteristics than vanilla systems (i.e. sys-
tems lacking self-healing capabilities). The system’s di-
agnostic capabilities are expected to enhance its manage-
ability by improving the selection and execution of (fully
or partially automated) repair mechanisms. Where 100%
automated repair mechanisms are lacking, effective, auto-
mated diagnosis can guide human operators, reducing the
total time and effort needed for performing repairs. We also
expect these systems to exhibit lower serviceability “costs”
e.g. lower yearly downtimes and a lower frequency of un-
expected servicing/maintenance events.
In this paper we employ analytical techniques based on
Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMCs) [12], specif-
ically Birth-Death processes and Non-Birth-Death pro-
cesses to construct Reliability, Availability and Serviceabil-
ity (RAS) models, which we use to evaluate a system’s self-
healing mechanisms and its overall self-healing capabilities.
We study the existing self-healing mechanisms of an
operating system and an application server hosting an N-
tier web-application. These recovery/repair mechanisms
are exercised using focused fault-injection. Based on the
experimental results of our fault-injection experiments we
construct a set of RAS-models, evaluate each remediation
mechanism individually, and then study the combined im-
pact of the remediation mechanisms on the system.
This paper makes two contributions. First, we show the
flexibility of simple RAS-models as they easily address two
of the challenges of evaluating self-healing systems – quan-
tifying the impact of imperfect remediation scenarios and
analyzing the various styles of remediations (reactive, pre-
ventative and proactive). This flexibility positions RAS-
models as a practical analysis tool for aiding in the develop-
ment of a comprehensive, quantitative benchmark for self-
healing systems.
Second, we demonstrate that it is possible to analyze
fault-injection experiments under simplifying Markovian
assumptions about fault distributions and system-failures
and still glean useful insights about the efficacy of a sys-
tem’s self-healing mechanisms. Further, we show that the
metrics obtained from RAS-models – remediation success
rates, limiting availability, limiting reliability and expected
yearly downtime – allow us to identify sub-optimal remedi-
ation mechanisms and reason about the design of improved
remediation mechanisms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; §2
defines some key terms. §3 describes the setup of the fault-
injection experiments conducted on our N-tier web applica-
tion’s components. §4 analyzes and discusses the results.
§5 covers related work and §6 presents our conclusions and
describes future work.
2 Terminology
In this section we formalize some of the terms used
throughout this paper.
• Error – the deviation of system external state from correct
service state [14].
• Fault – the adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error [14].
• Fault Hypothesis/Fault Model – the set of faults a self-
healing system is expected to be able to heal [13].
• Remediation – the process of correcting a fault. In this paper
remediation spans the activities of detection, diagnosis and
repair since the first step in responding to a fault is detection
[13].
• Failure – an event that occurs when the delivered service vi-
olates an environmental/contextual constraint e.g. a policy or
SLA. This definition emphasizes the client-side (end-user’s)
perspective over the server-side perspective [1].
• Reliability – the number (or frequency) of client-side inter-
ruptions.
• Availability – a function of the rate of failure/maintenance
events and the speed of recovery [10].
• Serviceability – a function of the number of service-visits
and their duration and costs.
3 Experiments
The goal of our experiments is to inject faults into spe-
cific components of the system under test and study its
response. The faults we inject are intended to exercise
the remediation mechanisms of the system. We use the
experimental data to mathematically model the impact of
the faults we inject on the system’s reliability, availability
and serviceability with and without the remediation mecha-
nisms.
Whereas our fault-injection experiments may expose the
system to rates of failure well above what the system may
see in a given time period, these artificially high failure rates
allow us to explore the expected and unexpected system re-
sponses under stressful fault conditions, much like perfor-
mance benchmarks subject the system under test to extreme
workloads.
To conduct our experiments we need: a test-platform,
i.e. a hardware/software stack executing a reasonable work-
load, a fault model, fault-injection tools, a set of remedia-
tion mechanisms and a set of system configurations.
For our test platform we use VMWare GSX virtual ma-
chines configured with: 512 MB RAM, 1 GB of swap, an
Intel x86 Core Solo processor and an 8 GB harddisk run-
ning Redhat 9 on 2.4.18 kernels. We use an instance of
the TPC-W web-application (based on the implementation
developed at the University of Madison-Wisconsin) run-
ning on MySQL 5.0.27, the Resin 3.0.22 application server
and webserver, and SunMicrosystems’ Hotspot Java Virtual
Machine (JVM), v1.5. We simulate a load of 20 users us-
ing the Shopping Mix [16] as their web-interaction strategy.
User-interactions are simulated using the Remote Browser
Emulator (RBE) software also implemented at the Univer-
sity of Madison-Wisconsin. Our VMs are hosted on a ma-
chine configured with 2 GB RAM, 2 GB of swap, an Intel
Core Solo T3100 Processor (1.66 GHz) and a 51 GB hard-
disk running Windows XP SP2.
Our fault model consists of device driver faults targeting
the Operating System and memory leaks targeting the appli-
cation server. We chose device driver faults because device
drivers account for∼70% of the Linux kernel code and have
error rates seven times higher than the rest of the kernel [4]
– faulty device drivers easily compromise the integrity and
reliability of the kernel. While memory leaks and general
state corruption (dangling pointers and damaged heaps) are
highlighted as common bugs leading to system crashes in
large-scale web deployments [3].
We identified the operating system and the application
server as candidate targets for fault-injection. Given the
operating system’s role as resource manager [25] and part
of the native execution environment for applications [8]
its reliability is critical to the overall stability of the ap-
plications it hosts. Similarly, application servers act as
containers for web-applications responsible for providing
a number of services, including but not limited to, isola-
tion, transaction management, instance management, re-
source management and synchronization. These responsi-
bilities make application-servers another critical link in a
web-application’s reliability and another prime target for
fault-injection. Database servers are also reasonable targets
for fault-injection; however database fault-injection exper-
iments are outside the scope of this work but will be the
focus of future work.
We use a version of the SWIFI device driver fault-
injection tools [17, 18] (University of Washington) and a
tool based on our own Kheiron/JVM [8] implementation for
application-server fault-injection.
There are three remediation mechanisms we consider:
(manual) system reboots, (automatic) application server
restarts and Nooks device driver protection and recovery
[17] – Nooks isolates the kernel from device drivers using
lightweight protection domains, as a result driver crashes
are less likely to cause a kernel crash. Further, Nooks sup-
ports the transparent recovery of a failed device driver.
Finally, we use the following system-configurations:
Configuration A – Fault-free system operation, Configu-
ration B – System operation in the presence of memory
leaks, Configuration C – System operation in the presence
of device-driver failures (Nooks disabled), Configuration
D – System operation in the presence of device-driver fail-
ures (Nooks enabled), and Configuration E – System op-
eration in the presence of memory leaks and driver failures
(Nooks enabled).
4 Results and Analysis
In our experiments we measure both client-side and
server-side activity. On the client-side we use the number
of web interactions and client-perceived rate of failure to
determine client-side availability.
A typical fault-free run of the TPC-W (Configuration
A), takes ∼24 minutes to complete and records 3973 suc-
cessful client-side interactions.
Figure 1 shows the client-side goodput over ∼76 hours
of continuous execution (187 runs) in the presence of an ac-
cumulating memory leak – Configuration B. The average
Figure 1. Client interactions – Configuration B
number of client-side interactions over this series of exper-
iments is 4032.3 ± 116.8473. In this figure there are nine
runs where the number of client interactions is 2 or more
standard deviations below the mean. Client-activity logs in-
dicate a number of successive failed HTTP requests over an
interval of ∼1 minute during these runs. Resin’s logs in-
dicate that the server encounteres a low-memory condition,
forces a number of JVM garbage collections before restart-
ing the application server. During the restart, requests sent
by RBE-clients fail to complete. A poisson fit of the time-
intervals between these nine runs at the 95% confidence in-
terval yields a hazard rate of 1 memory-leak related failure
(Resin restart) every 8.1593 hours.
Figure 2 shows a trace sampling the number of client
interactions completed every 60 seconds for a typical run,
(Run #2), compared to data from some runs where low
memory conditions cause Resin to restart. Data obtained
from Resin’s logs record startup times of 3,092 msecs
(initial startup) and restart times of approximately 47,582
msecs.
Figure 2. Client-side Interaction Trace - Configuration B
To evaluate the RAS-characteristics of the system in the
presence of the memory leak, we use the SHARPE RAS-
modeling and analysis tool [20] to create the basic 2-node,
2-parameter RAS-model shown in Figure 3. Table 1 lists
the model’s parameters.
Figure 3. Simple RAS Model
S0 an UP state where the system services requests
S1 a DOWN state, no client requests are serviced
while the application server is being restarted
λfailure observed rate of failure, 1 failure every 8 hours
µrestart time to restart the application server, ∼47 seconds
Table 1. RAS-Model Parameters – Configuration B
Whereas the model shown in Figure 3 implicitly assumes
that the detection of the low memory condition is perfect
and the restart of the application server resolves the problem
100% of the time, in this instance these assumptions are
validated by the experiments.








the steady state availability of the system is
99.838%. Further, the system has an expected downtime
of 866 minutes per year – given by the formula (1 −
Availability)∗T where T = 525, 600minutes in a year. At
best, the system is capable of delivering two 9’s of availabil-
ity. Table 2 shows the expected penalties per year for each
minute of downtime over the allowed limit. As an additional
consideration, downtime may also incur costs in terms of
time and money spent on service visits, parts and/or labor,
which add to any assessed penalties.
Availability guarantee Max downtime per year Expected penalties
99.999 ∼5 mins (866 - 5)*$p
99.99 ∼53 mins (866 - 53)*$p
99.9 ∼526 mins (866 - 526)*$p
99 ∼5256 mins $0
Table 2. Expected SLA Penalties for Configuration B
In Configuration C we inject faults into the pcnet32 de-
vice driver with Nooks driver protection disabled. Each
injected fault leads to a kernel panic requiring a reboot to
make the system operational again. For this set experiments
we arbitrarily choose a fault rate of 4 device failures ev-
ery 8 hours and use the SWIFI tools to achieve this rate of
failures in our system under test. The fact that that the re-
mediation mechanism (the reboot) always restores the sys-
tem to an operational state allows us to reuse the basic 2-
parameter RAS-model shown in Figure 3 to evaluate the
RAS-characteristics of the system in the presence of device
driver faults. Table 3 shows the parameters of the model.
S0 an UP state where the system services requests
S1 a DOWN state, no client requests are serviced
while the application server is being restarted
λfailure achieved rate of failure, 4 failures every 8 hours
µrestart time to reboot the system, 1 minute 22 seconds
Table 3. RAS-Model Parameters – Configuration C
Using SHARPE, we calculate the steady state availabil-
ity of the system as 98.87%, with an expected downtime of
5924 minutes per year i.e. under this fault-load the system
cannot deliver two nines of availability.
Next we consider the case of the system under test en-
hanced with Nooks device driver protection enabled – Con-
figuration D. Whereas we reuse the same fault-load and
fault-rate, 4 device driver failures every 8 hours, we need to
revise the RAS-model used in our analysis to account for
the possibility of imperfect repair i.e. to handle cases where
Nooks is unable to recover the failed device driver and re-
store the system to an operational state. To achieve this we
use the RAS-model shown in Figure 4, its parameters are
listed in Table 4.
Figure 4. RAS-Model of a system with imperfect repair
S0 an UP state where the system services requests
S1 an UP state, where Nooks is recovering a failed
driver
S2 a DOWN state, where Nooks’ recovery attempt
fails and the system needs to be rebooted
λdriver failure achieved rate of failure, 4 failures every 8 hours
µnooks recovery time for Nooks to successfully recover a failed
device driver, 4093 microseconds worst case
c the coverage factor, represents the success rate
of Nooks, varying this parameter lets us study
the impact of imperfect recovery
µreboot time to reboot the system, 1 minute 22 seconds
Table 4. RAS-Model Parameters – Configuration D
Figure 5 shows the expected impact of Nooks recov-
ery on the system’s RAS-characteristics as its success rate
varies.
Whereas Configuration C of the system under test is un-
able to deliver two 9’s of availability in the presence of de-
vice driver faults, a modest 20% success rate from Nooks
is expected to promote the system into another availabil-
ity bracket while a 92% success rate reduces the expected
Figure 5. Availability – Configuration D
downtime and SLA penalties by two orders of magnitude
(see Figure 5) 1.
Thus far we have analyzed the system under test and
each fault in isolation i.e. each RAS-model we have de-
veloped so far considers one fault and its remediations. We
now develop a RAS-model that considers all the faults in
our fault-model and the remediations available, Configura-
tion E – see Figure 6.
Figure 6. Complete RAS-model – Configuration E
Figure 7 shows the expected availability of the com-
plete system. The system’s availability is limited to two 9’s
of availability even though the system could deliver better
availability and downtime numbers – the minimum system
downtime is calculated as 866 minutes per year, the same
as for Configuration B, the memory leak scenario. Thus,
even with perfect Nooks recovery, the system’s availability
is limited by the reactive remediation for the memory leak.
To improve the system’s overall availability we need to im-
prove the handling of the memory leak.
One option for improvement is to consider preventative
maintenance. For this to be an option we assume that the
1In our experiments we were unable to encounter a scenario where
Nooks was unable to successfully recover a failed device driver; however
the point of our exercise is to demonstrate how that eventually could be
accounted for in an evaluation of a remediation mechanism.
Figure 7. Availability – Configuration E
system’s failure distribution is hypoexponential. We divide
the system’s lifetime into two stages, where the time spent
in each state is exponentially distributed.
We use the RAS-model shown in Figure 8 in our analy-
sis. Its parameters are listed in Table 5.
Figure 8. Preventative Maintenance RAS-model
Using these parameters we plot the graph shown in Fig-
ure 9, which shows the expected availability of the system
as λinspect varies. We see that performing a check 6 times
every hour and performing preventative maintenance is ex-
pected to improve the system’s availability; however, ac-
tually implementing this scheme and running more experi-
ments is the only way to validate this model.
In summary, our analysis of existing remediations and a
yet-to-be-added preventative maintenance scheme produce
artifacts (measurements and models) that can validate or
justify system (re)design decisions.
5 Related Work
The work most similar to ours is [7]. In this paper the au-
thors build a RAS model to explore the expected impact of
Memory Page Retirement (MPR) on hardware faults associ-
ated with failing memory modules on systems running So-
laris 10. MPR removes a physical page of memory from use
S0 an UP state, 1st stage of system lifetime
S1 an UP state, 2nd stage of system lifetime
S2 a DOWN state, application server is restarted
S3 an UP state, free-memory inspection occurs
during the 1st stage of the system’s lifetime
S4 an UP state, free-memory inspection occurs
during the 2nd stage of the system’s lifetime.
A preventative restart is carried out returning
the system to the first stage of its lifetime
S5 a DOWN state, preventative restart occurs
λ2ndstage rate of transition into 2nd stage of its lifetime,
once every six hours
λfailure rate of transition into low-memory condition
state, once in either the 7th or 8th hour
µrestart resin worst time to restart Resin under
low-memory conditions, ∼47 seconds
λinspect rate of free-memory trend-checks
µinspect time to conduct free-memory check,
21,627 microseconds
µrestart resin pm best-case time to restart application,
server 3,092 milliseconds
Table 5. Preventative maintenance model parameters
Figure 9. Expected impact of preventative maintenance
by the system in response to error correction code (ECC)
errors associated with that page. Using their models the
authors investigate the expected impact of MPR on yearly
downtime, the number of service interruptions and the num-
ber of servicing visits due to hardware permanent faults.
Unlike our experiments, which focus on software and rely
on fault injection experiments to collect data, the authors
focus on hardware failures and use field data from deployed
low-end and mid-range server systems to build models.
In [6] the authors study the availability of the Sun Java
System Application Server, Enterprise Edition 7. The au-
thors use hierarchical Markov reward models to model and
obtain average system availability estimates. In a dis-
tributed load-balanced deployment, including two applica-
tion server instances, 2 pairs of Highly Available Databases
(HADBs) – used as http session state stores – an Ora-
cle database and a Sun Java System Directory Server, the
authors induce faults concerned with whole-node removal
to investigate the system’s (session) fail-over and recovery
mechanisms. Our experiments differ in the granularity of
our fault-injection; rather than remove entire nodes, we fo-
cus on injecting faults in the individual components of a sin-
gle node. Further, whereas we do not focus on evaluating re-
mediation mechanisms that rely on whole-node redundancy
or failover, RAS-modeling techniques can be adapted for
this [12].
[9] describes the DBench-OLTP dependability bench-
mark. We differ from this work in our choice of metrics.
The measures prescribed in the DBench-OLTP specifica-
tion include but are not limited to: transactions per minute
(tpmC), price per transaction ($/tpmC), availability from the
system under test and remote terminal emulator points of
view. We focus less on performance-related measures and
present ways to analyze the impact of the system’s remedia-
tion mechanisms on the system’s reliability, availability and
serviceability.
FAUMachine [22] (formerly UMLinux) is a virtualiza-
tion platform supporting fault-injection. The faults that can
be injected include, but are not limited to: bit flips in mem-
ory and CPU registers, block device failures and network
failures. For our experiments we required more fine-grained
control over the faults injected. Further, the faults that could
be injected using FAUMachine would not appropriately ex-
ercise the remediation mechanisms of our target system.
Our work is complementary to the work done on ro-
bustness benchmarking [5] and fault-tolerant benchmarking
[27]. However, we focus less on the robustness of individual
component interfaces for our fault-injection and more on
system recovery in the presence of component-level faults
i.e. resource leaks or delays.
[1] conducts a study of availability and maintainabil-
ity benchmarks using software RAID systems. In addi-
tion to studying availability from the end-user perspective
as these authors do, we also include the use of mathemati-
cal models to assist in the analysis of existing and potential
remediation-mechanisms.
[15] describes the System Recovery Benchmark. The
authors propose measuring system recovery on a non-
clustered standalone system. The focus of the work is on de-
tailed measurements of system startup, restart and recovery
events. Our work is complementary to this, relying on mea-
suring startup, restart and recovery times at varying granu-
larity. We consider these measurements at node-granularity
as well as application/component granularity.
[2] describes work towards a self-healing benchmark. In
our work we analyze the individual mechanisms that impact
the quality of service metrics of interest. Our focus on how
the system accomplishes healing and its relation to the high-
level system goals, dictated by SLAs and policies.
6 Conclusions & Future Work
In this paper we use reliability, availability and ser-
viceability (RAS) metrics and models, coupled with fault-
injection experiments, to analyze the impact of self-healing
mechanisms on these high-level (RAS) metrics of interest.
We also highlight the versatility of these models by employ-
ing them to briefly study and design various styles of reme-
diations, analyze the impact of failed remediations and iden-
tify sub-optimal remediations. Based on our experiments
and the metrics obtained we conclude that RAS-models are
reasonable, rigorous, analytical tools for evaluating self-
healing systems and their mechanisms.
For future work, we are interested in conducting ad-
ditional fault-injection experiments and analytical studies
on different operating system platforms, including Solaris
10, which has been designed with a number of self-healing
mechanisms [24, 21]. We will also continue our work de-
veloping practical fault-injection tools.
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